記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：University of Chicago Press  

DOI： 10.1086/727808

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

This paper extends a model of repeated partnerships by Radner et al. (1986) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose their sharing rule. A sharing rule is optimal if the repeated game under the sharing rule has a public strategy equilibrium whose payoff sum is not improved by any public strategy equilibrium under any sharing rule. Two key factors for the analysis are the efficiency loss from allowing only the more productive partner to work and the efficiency loss in any cooperative equilibrium from imperfect observability. If the latter loss is smaller than the former, a threshold discount factor exists below which an asymmetric sharing rule inducing only one partner to work every period is optimal. At the threshold, an optimal sharing rule uniquely exists that is also optimal for any greater discount factor. The latter sharing rule reduces to the equal sharing rule for identical partners. The optimal equilibrium payoff sum as a function of the discount factor is a step function whose jump occurs at the threshold discount factor. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

We investigate optimal collusion in repeated multimarket contact under imperfect public monitoring, where two firms operate in m markets and in each market, each firm's decision and public signals are binary. We show that in an optimal pure strategy strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium, the size of efficiency loss is equal to that in the market with the most tempting deviation under single-market contact. Furthermore, we show a sufficient condition under which the symmetric equilibrium is optimal for joint payoff maximization among any perfect public equilibrium. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.031

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開催年月日： 2015年8月

記述言語：英語   会議種別：口頭発表（一般）  

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