Organization
Faculty of Informatics Professor
Title
Professor
External link
OHTA,Katsunori
Degree
-
博士（経済学） ( 2005.3 神戸大学 )
Research Interests
-
Microeconomics
-
Game Theory
Research Areas
-
Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory
Education
-
Kobe University Graduate School of Economics Doctor Course
2002.4 - 2005.3
-
Kobe University Graduate School of Economics Master Course
2000.4 - 2002.3
-
Keio University Department of Economics Bachelor Course
1996.4 - 2000.3
Research History
-
Kansai University Faculty of Informatics Professor
2021.4
-
Wakayama University Department of Economics Associate Professor
2008.4 - 2021.3
-
Wakayama University Department of economics Assistant Professor
2007.4 - 2008.3
-
Kyoto University Institute of Economic Research Post Doctoral Fellow
2006.4 - 2007.3
-
Kobe University Graduate School of Economics Lecturer
2005.4 - 2006.3
Professional Memberships
-
Game Theory Society
-
JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
-
Econometric Society
Papers
-
Burden Sharing and Self-Enforcing Climate Agreements Reviewed
Shuichi Ohori, Katsunori Ohta
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 11 ( 4 ) 827 - 852 2024.7
-
Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships Reviewed
Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta, Tadashi Sekiguchi
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 166 311 - 323 2016.11
-
Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact Reviewed
Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 76 ( 2 ) 636 - 647 2012.11
-
Multimarket contact in continuous-time games Reviewed
Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta
ECONOMICS LETTERS 101 ( 1 ) 4 - 5 2008.10
Presentations
-
Repeated Partnerships with Decreasing Returns
Katsunori Ohta
The 11th World Congress of The Econometric Society 2015.8
Research Projects
-
Burden-sharing and self-enforcing international agreements on international public goods provisions
Grant number：20K01548 2020.4 - 2023.3
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Grant amount：\3380000 （ Direct Cost: \2600000 、 Indirect Cost：\780000 ）
-
Repeated games and international trade cooperation on non-tariff trade barrier
Grant number：17K03690 2017.4 - 2020.3
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Ohta Katsunori
Grant amount：\2080000 （ Direct Cost: \1600000 、 Indirect Cost：\480000 ）
This study considers international cooperation between large countries when we take unobservable trade barriers into consideration. For this purpose, this study uses infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In the context of two-country two-commodity models, we can use terms-of-trade as a public signal. Terms-of-trade has a fine property for statistical distinguishability of deviations, because the deviation from an agreement improves the terms-of-trade for the deviator, whereas it changes the opponents terms-of-trade for the worse. We construct a simple asymmetric strategy based on terms-of-trade, which we call safeguard strategy. This study examines the condition that safeguards strategy becomes equilibrium.
This study also considers international cooperation by asymmetric strategies in the context of international environmental agreements. -
Repeated game analysis on long-term partnerships
Grant number：26780122 2014.4 - 2017.3
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
OHTA KATSUNORI, KOBAYASHI Hajime, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi
Grant amount：\1950000 （ Direct Cost: \1500000 、 Indirect Cost：\450000 ）
We investigate cooperation in teams by theoretical analysis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In particular, we extend the model of repeated partnerships by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986, Review of economic Studies) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose and commit their sharing rule to achieve the most efficient equilibrium in the sense of maximizing the partners' total payoffs. We characterize the optimal sharing rule which supports the most efficient equilibrium payoff vector. We also consider the situation where it is not efficient for all members to work, and obtain the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve exact efficiency. Even when the condition fails, we obtain the approximate efficiency result.
-
Accumulating Information in Repeated Financial Transactions: Theory and Experiment
Grant number：24530207 2012.4 - 2015.3
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
KOBAYASHI Hajime, OHTA Katsunori, SAITO Tetsuya, SHICHIJO Tatsuhiro
Grant amount：\4550000 （ Direct Cost: \3500000 、 Indirect Cost：\1050000 ）
We investigated a moral hazard problem in financial transactions. Specifically, we consider a repeated prisoner's dilemma between two players in which players can not observe the opponent's action but imperfectly observe signals depending on their actions. We compare efficiency losses in the different timings of releasing information combining with the different levels of noise of signals.
We found that the level of cooperation decreases as the timing of releasing signal becomes late. This experimental result implies that timely disclosure policy enhances efficiency in financial markets. -
Formation of collaboration network in long-term relationships
Grant number：19730145 2007 - 2008
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
KOBAYASHI Hazime, OHTA Katsunori, SUEHIRO Hideo, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi
Grant amount：\1810000 （ Direct Cost: \1600000 、 Indirect Cost：\210000 ）
-
Repeated games and collusive behavior
Grant number：19730174 2007 - 2008
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
OHTA Katsunori, KOBAYASHI Hajime, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi
Grant amount：\690000 （ Direct Cost: \600000 、 Indirect Cost：\90000 ）