Updated on 2024/04/24

写真a

 
OKANO,Yoshitaka
 
Organization
Faculty of Economics Professor
Title
Professor
External link

Research Interests

  • Behavioral Economics

  • 実験経済学

  • ゲーム理論

Research Areas

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory  / Experimental Economics

Education

  • The University of Tokyo

    2003.4 - 2007.3

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  • The University of Tokyo

    2001.4 - 2003.3

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  • Kobe University   Faculty of Economics   Department of Economics

    1997.4 - 2001.3

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Research History

  • Kansai University   Faculty of Economics   Professor

    2024.4

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  • Kansai University   Faculty of Economics   Associate Professor

    2021.4 - 2024.3

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  • Kochi University of Technology   Lecturer

    2015.4 - 2021.3

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  • Kochi University of Technology   School of Management   Lecturer

    2013.4 - 2015.3

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  • Osaka University   The Institute of Social and Economic Research

    2008.4 - 2013.3

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  • The University of Tokyo

    2007.4 - 2008.3

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Papers

  • Groups versus individuals, partial lying, and social image concern in a dice-rolling experiment Reviewed

    Yoshitaka Okano, Eiji Goto

    The Japanese Economic Review   75   301 - 331   2024.4

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00139-0

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  • Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games Reviewed

    Masaki Aoyagi, Naoko Nishimura, Yoshitaka Okano

    EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS   25 ( 2 )   444 - 482   2022.4

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER  

    An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 x 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (NE). The two players may have either common or conflicting interests over the two NE. This paper studies a redistribution scheme which allows the players to voluntarily transfer their payoffs after the play of an inequality game. We find that the redistribution scheme induces positive transfer from player 1 to player 2 in both common- and conflicting- interest games, and is particularly effective in increasing efficient coordination and reducing coordination failures in conflicting-interest games. We explain these findings by considering reciprocity by player 1 in response to the sacrifice made by player 2 in achieving efficient coordination in conflicting-interest games.

    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09719-6

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  • Detecting motives for cooperation in public goods experiments Reviewed

    Takafumi Yamakawa, Yoshitaka Okano, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS   19 ( 2 )   500 - 512   2016.6

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER  

    This study clarifies the types of motives that are important as a source of cooperation in a linear public goods experiment. Our experimental design separates contributions into those due to confusion, one-shot motives (which includes altruism, warm-glow, inequality aversion, and conditional cooperation), and multi-round motives (which includes a strategic motive under incomplete information, a failure of backward induction, and reciprocity). The experiment reveals that multi-round motives plays an important role in driving cooperative behavior. Confusion and one-shot motives play a minor role.

    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9451-2

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  • Re-examination of team's play in a mixed-strategy game experiment Reviewed

    Yoshitaka Okano

    APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS   23 ( 8 )   601 - 604   2016.5

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD  

    Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) found that the behaviour of professional soccer players in two-person zero-sum games is consistent with minimax play, while Wooders (2010) re-examined their data and found inconsistencies in several respects. This study applies a similar analysis of Wooders (2010) to the experimental data in Okano (2013), which found that the behaviour of teams of two-student subjects conforms closely to minimax play, and addresses whether teams exhibit the same inconsistencies as professionals. Teams were found to have consistency with minimax play, with no tendencies similar to those of professionals.

    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1090545

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  • Preemptive Striking in Individual and Group Conflict Reviewed

    Nobuhiro Mifune, Yoichi Hizen, Yoshio Kamijo, Yoshitaka Okano

    PLOS ONE   11 ( 5 )   e0154859   2016.5

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:PUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCE  

    In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment to assess preemptive striking by and towards individuals or groups. In the framework of a preemptive strike game, we set the following four conditions: one person faced another person, one person faced a three-person group, a three-person group faced an individual, and a three-person group faced another three-person group. Previous studies have revealed that greed is activated when participants belong to a group, while fear is activated when participants interact with a group, and further, that attacking behaviors in the preemptive strike game are driven by fear. These observations led to a hypothesis that high attack rates would be realized when participants interact with a group, regardless of whether the participants make decisions as individuals or a group. The results of our experiment, however, rejected this hypothesis. Among the four conditions, the attack rate was highest when a three-person group faced an individual. As possible reasons for our observation, we discuss the potential threat stemming from the imbalance in the effectiveness of attack between individuals and groups, and the (incorrect) belief by groups that single individuals would be more likely to attack out of fear.

    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0154859

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  • The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally Reviewed

    Takehito Masuda, Yoshitaka Okano, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR   83   73 - 85   2014.1

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in multiple solution concepts including backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects' responses to the questionnaire reveal heterogeneous reasoning processes and highlight the importance of developing mechanisms that implement the desired social choice outcome in multiple solution concepts. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.003

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  • Minimax play by teams Reviewed

    Yoshitaka Okano

    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR   77 ( 1 )   168 - 180   2013.1

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    We analyze the behavior of two-person teams and individuals who repeatedly play the game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory. When teams play O'Neill's 4 x 4 game against another team, the choice frequencies are consistent with equilibrium of the game at the decision-maker level. In contrast, individuals against another individual play far from equilibrium, as previous experiments have found. The hide-and-seek game experiment reveals that teams' behavior is less heterogeneous than individuals. When teams play O'Neill's game against individuals, teams win at above the equilibrium rate in one treatment, but not in the other. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.003

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  • Using Economic Games to Investigate the Neural Substrates of CognitiveProcesses Reviewed

    Masao Nagatsuka, Hideo Shinagawa, Yoshitaka Okano, Yuri Kitamura, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    American Journal ofClinical Medicine Research   1 ( 4 )   71 - 74   2013

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  • Emergence of Opinion Leaders Based on Agent Model and Its Impact on Stock Prices Reviewed

    Tadanobu Misawa, Kyoko Suzuki, Yoshitaka Okano, Tetsuya Shimokawa

    ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING IN JAPAN   177 ( 2 )   32 - 40   2011.11

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:WILEY-BLACKWELL  

    The development of information technology has made it possible to obtain large amounts of information easily. Thus it appears likely that the impact on a society of word-of-mouth information communication and the like has been growing. In this paper, we propose a model of the emergence of opinion leaders based on word of mouth in an artificial stock market. The process of emergence of opinion leaders and the impact of opinion leaders on stock prices are verified by simulation. (C) 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 177(2): 32-40, 2011; Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/eej.21163

    DOI: 10.1002/eej.21163

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  • Predicting investment behavior: An augmented reinforcement learning model Reviewed

    Tetsuya Shimokawa, Kyoko Suzuki, Tadanobu Misawa, Yoshitaka Okano

    NEUROCOMPUTING   72 ( 16-18 )   3447 - 3461   2009.10

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

    The goal of this paper is to augment the ordinal temporal-difference type (TD-type) reinforcement learning model in order to detect the most suitable learning model of the human decision-making process in financial investment tasks. The simplicity and robustness of the TD-type learning model is fascinating. However, the available evidence and our observation suggest the necessity of introducing the nonlinear effect in learning and the possibility that additional factors might play important roles in the investment decision-making process. To extend the ordinal TD-type learning model, we adopt a three-layered perceptron as the basis function and the hierarchical Bayesian method to calibrate the parameter values. The result of the predictive test suggests that the augmented TD-type learning model constructed in this paper can evade the overfitting and can predict people's investment behavior well as compared to other familiar learning models. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.neucom.2008.11.031

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Books

  • 人間行動と市場デザイン

    西條 辰義, 草川 孝夫, 岡野 芳隆, 広田 真一, 西村 直子, 川村 哲也, 舛田 武仁, 品川 英朗

    勁草書房  2016  ( ISBN:9784326349128

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    Language:Japanese  

    CiNii Books

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MISC

  • 集合住宅における排出権取引の制度設計―摂津市南千里丘の事例―

    瀋俊毅, 草川孝夫, 岡野芳隆, 山川敬史, 西崎勝彦, 西條辰義

    都市問題研究   61 ( 9 )   47 - 61   2009.9

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  • Emergence of opinion leaders based on agent model and its impact to stock prices

    Tadanobu Misawa, Kyoko Suzuki, Yoshitaka Okano, Tetsuya Shimokawa

    IEEJ Transactions on Electronics, Information and Systems   129 ( 2 )   21 - 343   2009

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    Language:English   Publisher:Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan  

    Recently, we can be able to get a lot of information easily because information technology has been developed. Therefore, it is thought that the impact to a society by communication of information such as word of mouth has been growing. In this paper, we propose a model of emergence of opinion leader based on word of mouth in artificial stock market. Moreover, the process of emergence of opinion leader and impact to stock prices by opinion leader are verified by simulation. © 2009 The Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan.

    DOI: 10.1541/ieejeiss.129.336

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  • 遺伝的アルゴリズムを用いた意思決定モデルのパラメータ推定

    木下寛大, 下川哲矢, 参沢匡将, 岡野芳隆

    情報処理学会全国大会講演論文集   70th ( 2 )   2.251-2.252 - 252   2008.3

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Research Projects

  • マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装

    Grant number:22H00062  2022.4 - 2027.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業  基盤研究(A)

    芹澤 成弘, 若山 琢磨, 舛田 武仁, 岡野 芳隆, 數村 友也, ZHOU YU, 孫 寧

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    Grant amount:\41340000 ( Direct Cost: \31800000 、 Indirect Cost:\9540000 )

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  • 代表者の意思決定に関する実験研究

    Grant number:22K01408  2022.4 - 2025.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業  基盤研究(C)

    岡野 芳隆

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    Grant amount:\4160000 ( Direct Cost: \3200000 、 Indirect Cost:\960000 )

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  • 集団の意思決定とその社会的「悪」影響に関する実験研究

    Grant number:19K01548  2019.4 - 2022.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 基盤研究(C)  基盤研究(C)

    岡野 芳隆

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    Grant amount:\4420000 ( Direct Cost: \3400000 、 Indirect Cost:\1020000 )

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  • Experimental research on learning, preference, and experience transfer of groups

    Grant number:16K17088  2016.4 - 2019.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    Okano Yoshitaka

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    Grant amount:\4030000 ( Direct Cost: \3100000 、 Indirect Cost:\930000 )

    In this study, the differences in behavior and thinking between groups and individuals are examined in multiple ways using the methods of economics experiments. We found that: (1) the information used when adjusting behavior over time is different between groups and individual, (2) the cooperation rate of groups in the social dilemma situation is lower, which is largely influenced by the social value orientation of the group members, and the deeper understanding of the strategic situation they are facing, and (3) groups disguise lying better than individuals.

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  • Experimental Investigations on Group Decision in Strategic Environments

    Grant number:26285047  2014.4 - 2019.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    KAMIJO Yoshio

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    Grant amount:\15990000 ( Direct Cost: \12300000 、 Indirect Cost:\3690000 )

    This study examined the preference changes of individuals through forming a group using experimental methods. It became clear that by becoming a group, people would like more selfish choices and risk averse choices. We also found that the determinants of group time preference tend to reflect the influence of those who emphasize short-term benefits more than those who emphasize long-term benefits. From experiments using a task (preemptive attack game) wherein participants consider whether or not to make defensive preemptive attacks from fear that an opponent may attack, it became clear that preemptive attacks from a group to an individual was higher than the other conditions.

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  • Theoretical and experimental investigations of rewards and punishments

    Grant number:26590029  2014.4 - 2017.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research  Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research

    KAMIJO Yoshio, MIFUNE Nobuhiro, OKANO Yoshitaka

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    Grant amount:\3640000 ( Direct Cost: \2800000 、 Indirect Cost:\840000 )

    We provide a game theoretical framework to explain how bottom punishment or top reward enhances performance of teams when there is heterogeneity across players in cost-performance relationships. We derive easy-to-check sufficient conditions to judge whether reward or punishment is better. From the sufficient condition, we know that punishment is better for less heterogeneous people and reward is better for more heterogeneous people if the performance function is additive. To check the theoretical predictions, we conducted the field and laboratory experiments. We found that while the reactions of the actual people to the two incentives are more complex than the predicted behavior by the theory, how they use sticks or carrots are consistent with the theoretical predictions.

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  • Experimental and theoretical study of bargaining on actions

    Grant number:25590046  2013.4 - 2016.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research  Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research

    Okano Yoshitaka, KAMIJO YOSHIO, MIFUNE NOBUHIRO

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    Grant amount:\3640000 ( Direct Cost: \2800000 、 Indirect Cost:\840000 )

    The essence of the problem we encounter today, such as regional conflict and destruction of environment, is adjustment between persons involved on interests and actions, which is typically done through the negotiation. This research project investigate experimentally how people negotiate in the group, and what they choose. In the preemptive strike game, which is developed in social psychology, groups became more aggressive against individuals. In two-person zero-sum game, groups behave more consistent with Nash equilibrium prediction than do individuals.

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  • Experimental Research forGroup Decision Making

    Grant number:22730161  2010 - 2012

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    OKANO Yoshitaka

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    Grant amount:\3900000 ( Direct Cost: \3000000 、 Indirect Cost:\900000 )

    Okano (2013) examined the decision makings between groups and individuals who play O’Neill’s (1987) game which is the game with win and loss, and found that the group decision making is more consistent with Nash equilibrium prediction. This indicates that Nash equilibrium has predictive power for the behavior of groups (This research was published in Games and Economic Behavior). By examining the various games, the experiments revealed that the positive synergies in group decision makings do not always occur. Furthermore, I studied theoretical analysis concerning the bargaining process within a group.

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Teaching Experience