Updated on 2024/09/24

写真a

 
OHORI,Shuichi
 
Organization
Faculty of Informatics Professor
Title
Professor
External link

Degree

  • 博士(経済学) ( 2005.1 )

Research Interests

  • Trade and the environment

  • Circular Economy

  • International environmental agreements

Research Areas

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory  / Game Theory

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic policy  / Environmental Economics

Education

  • Kyoto University   Graduate School of Economics

    2001.4 - 2005.1

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  • 京都大学大学院   経済学研究科修士課程

    1999.4 - 2001.3

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Research History

  • 関西大学総合情報学部   教授

    2014.4

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  • 関西大学総合情報学部   准教授

    2012.4 - 2014.3

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  • 岐阜聖徳学園大学経済情報学部   准教授

    2007.4 - 2012.3

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  • Kyoto University   Institute of Economic Research

    2005.4 - 2007.3

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Professional Memberships

  • 日本経済学会

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  • Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

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  • European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

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  • Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

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Papers

  • 循環経済における製品寿命に関する理論的一考察 Reviewed

    大堀秀一, 紀國洋, 友田康信

    環境経済・政策研究   17 ( 2 )   2024.9

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    Authorship:Lead author   Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

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  • Preferences for electric scooter sharing in Japan

    SSRN Discussion Paper   2024.9

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    Authorship:Corresponding author   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

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  • 日本における電動キックボードシェアリングの普及に向けた課題 Reviewed

    今村勇哉, 富田貴子, 大堀秀一

    環境経済・政策研究   17 ( 2 )   2024.9

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    Authorship:Last author   Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

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  • Burden sharing and self-enforcing climate agreements Reviewed

    OHORI,Shuichi, OHTA, Katsunori

    Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists   11(4)   2024

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  • Advance Disposal Fee vs. Disposal Fee: A Monopolistic Producer’s Durability Choice Model Reviewed

    Ohori,Shuichi, Kinokuni, Hiroshi, Tomoda, Yasunobu

    Resource and Energy Economics   65, 101242.   2021.8

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  • Optimal deposit-refund systems

    Ohori,Shuichi, Kinokuni, Hiroshi, Tomoda, Yasunobu

    Discussion Paper Series (Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University)   No.21001, pp.1-21.   2021.7

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  • Firm-level Incentives for Voluntary Environmental Investment

    Hiroshi Kinokuni, Yasunobu Tomoda, Shuichi Ohori

    The economic studies   69 ( 2 )   7 - 17   2020.1

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    Authorship:Last author   Language:Japanese  

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  • Optimal Waste Disposal Fees When Product Durability is Endogenous: Accounting for Planned Obsolescence Reviewed

    Hiroshi Kinokuni,, Shuichi Ohori, and, Yasunobu Tomoda

    Environmental and Resource Economics   Vol.73 (1), pp.33-50.   2019

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  • Privatization of solid waste collection firm

    Ohori,Shuichi, Kinokuni, Hiroshi, Tomoda, Yasunobu

    EGC working paper   2018/03, pp.1-12.   2018.3

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  • Price and quantity competition in a mixed duopoly with emission tax Reviewed

    Shuichi Ohori

    Theoretical Economics Letters   Vol. 4 (2), pp. 133-138   2014

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  • Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets Reviewed

    Shuichi Ohori

    Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade   Vol.12(2), pp.169-176 ( 2 )   169 - 176   2012

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    This paper investigates the optimal rate of environmental tax and level of privatization in a vertical relationship between one partially privatized producer and two private sellers. The main results are as follows: First, privatization of the producer firm decreases environmental damage. Second, the optimal environmental tax rate equals the Pigouvian level. Third, fully nationalizing the producer firm is optimal when the government simultaneously decides upon the environmental tax rate
    then, privatization decreases social welfare. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-010-0093-y

    Scopus

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  • DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY Reviewed

    Shuichi Ohori

    AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS   Vol.50 (1), pp.40-50 ( 1 )   40 - 50   2011

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:WILEY  

    This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady-state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non-cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race-to-the-bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8454.2011.00410.x

    Web of Science

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  • Environmental policy instruments and foreign ownership Reviewed

    Shuichi Ohori

    Environmental Economics and Policy Studies   Vol.13 (1), pp.65-78   2011

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  • Motivation of Japanese companies to take environmental action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions: an econometric analysis Reviewed

    Seiji Ikkatai, Daisuke Ishikawa, Shuichi Ohori, Kengo Sasaki

    SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE   Vol.3(1),pp.145-154 ( 1 )   145 - 154   2008

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER TOKYO  

    To analyze the motivations of Japanese companies to take environmental actions to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, we used FY2006 research data and questioned Japanese industries regarding their reduction of GHG emissions. Empirical investigations revealed that voluntary targets set by industry organizations, government requirements, and advance responses to possible future regulations can positively influence environmental actions for GHG emission reduction; however, cost reductions and corporate social responsibility fulfillment cannot.

    DOI: 10.1007/s11625-008-0048-y

    Web of Science

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  • Trade liberalization, consumption externalities and the environment: a mixed duopoly approach Reviewed

    Shuichi Ohori

    Economics Bulletin   Vol.17 (5), pp.1-9   2006

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  • Optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopoly Reviewed

    S Ohori

    JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS   Vol.29 (2), pp.225-233 ( 2 )   225 - 233   2006

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER  

    This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination.

    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-6037-0

    Web of Science

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  • Environmental Tax, Trade, and Privatization Reviewed

    Ohori Shuichi

    The Kyoto Economic Review   Vol.73 (2), pp.109-120 ( 2 )   109 - 120   2004

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    Language:English   Publisher:Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University  

    The analysis presented in this paper explores the interaction among privatization, environmental, and trade policies. In particular, we consider the optimal environmental tax and tariff, and the effects of privatization of a public firm in international duopolistic markets with environmental damage. There are three main results. First, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the marginal environmental damage and the optimal tariff is strictly positive regardless of whether or not the home public firm is privatized. Second, privatization leads to the increase in the optimal environmental taxes and tariffs in both countries. Third, under the optimal environmental tax and tariff, privatization results in the reduction of social welfare and in environmental improvement.<br>

    DOI: 10.11179/ker.73.109

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Books

  • サステイナビリティの経済学

    パーサ・ダスグプタ

    岩波書店  2007 

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    植田和弘編訳第6章,第10章,第二部及び第三部プロローグ担当

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Research Projects

  • 国際相互依存下での環境政策

    科学研究費補助金 

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    Grant type:Competitive

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  • International environmental policy

    0006 (Japanese Only) 

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    Grant type:Competitive

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