記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER  

In this study, we investigate a search model with divisible fiat money in a laboratory setting. In the model, there are multiple equilibria with various money holdings distributions. The purpose of this study is to investigate the behavior of subjects and the efficiency of endogenously determined money holdings distributions and transaction prices in this environment. We find that such endogenizing enhanced the coordination of subjects through monetary exchange. The subjects endogenously reduced the trade friction of monetary exchanges and chose relatively efficient money holdings distributions and transaction prices. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.014

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC  

This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, we also consider endogenous investment timing. In the experiment, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making any decision, a subject sends the other player a free message that takes the form of continuous numerical value. The results show that both the cheap talk and the endogenous investment timing improve the efficiency of investments significantly, but the effect of the former is weaker than that of the latter. Moreover, data shows that when subjects' decision timing is endogenous, additional information from the cheap talk cannot further improve investment efficiency. Finally, the data report a high proportion of subjects sending truth-telling messages, which is close to the value of the private signal. However, some subjects send exaggerated messages that are higher than their private signals, and the proportion of these subjects increases with time.

DOI： 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101519

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

This paper extends a model of repeated partnerships by Radner et al. (1986) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose their sharing rule. A sharing rule is optimal if the repeated game under the sharing rule has a public strategy equilibrium whose payoff sum is not improved by any public strategy equilibrium under any sharing rule. Two key factors for the analysis are the efficiency loss from allowing only the more productive partner to work and the efficiency loss in any cooperative equilibrium from imperfect observability. If the latter loss is smaller than the former, a threshold discount factor exists below which an asymmetric sharing rule inducing only one partner to work every period is optimal. At the threshold, an optimal sharing rule uniquely exists that is also optimal for any greater discount factor. The latter sharing rule reduces to the equal sharing rule for identical partners. The optimal equilibrium payoff sum as a function of the discount factor is a step function whose jump occurs at the threshold discount factor. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

We investigate optimal collusion in repeated multimarket contact under imperfect public monitoring, where two firms operate in m markets and in each market, each firm's decision and public signals are binary. We show that in an optimal pure strategy strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium, the size of efficiency loss is equal to that in the market with the most tempting deviation under single-market contact. Furthermore, we show a sufficient condition under which the symmetric equilibrium is optimal for joint payoff maximization among any perfect public equilibrium. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.031

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：神戸大学経済経営学会  

CiNii Books

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：神戸大学経済経営学会  

CiNii Books

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：神戸大学  

CiNii Books

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：神戸大学  

CiNii Books

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