Updated on 2024/03/30

写真a

 
KOBAYASHI,Hajime
 
Organization
Faculty of Economics Professor
Title
Professor
External link

Degree

  • Doctor of Business Administration ( 2002.3   Kobe University )

Research Areas

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory  / Organizational Economics, Repeated Game, Experimental Economics

Education

  • Kobe University   Graduate School of Business Administration

    1997.4 - 2002.3

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    Country: Japan

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  • University of Tsukuba   Master's Program in Management and Public Policy

    1995.4 - 1997.3

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    Country: Japan

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  • Hosei University   Faculty of Economics   Department of Economics

    1991.4 - 1995.3

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    Country: Japan

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Research History

  • Kochi University of Technology   Research Institute for Future Design   Visiting Professor

    2020.4

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    Country:Japan

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  • Monash University   Department of Economics   Visiting Researcher

    2019.2

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    Country:Australia

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  • University of Bologna   Faculty of Economics   Visiting Researcher

    2018.10

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    Country:Italy

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  • Kansai University   Faculty of Economics   Professor

    2013.4

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    Country:Japan

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  • Kansai University   Faculty of Economics   Associate Professor

    2011.4 - 2013.3

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    Country:Japan

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  • Kyoto University   Institute of Economic Research   Invited Researcher

    2008.4 - 2009.3

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    Country:Japan

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  • Osaka Prefecture University   School of Economics   Associate Professor

    2006.4 - 2011.3

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    Country:Japan

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  • Osaka Prefecture University   School of Economics   Lecturer

    2002.4 - 2006.3

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    Country:Japan

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Papers

  • On the monetary exchange with multiple equilibrium money holdings distributions: An experimental approach

    Kazuya Kamiya, Hajime Kobayashi, Tatsuhiro Shichijo, Takashi Shimizu

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION   183   206 - 232   2021.3

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER  

    In this study, we investigate a search model with divisible fiat money in a laboratory setting. In the model, there are multiple equilibria with various money holdings distributions. The purpose of this study is to investigate the behavior of subjects and the efficiency of endogenously determined money holdings distributions and transaction prices in this environment. We find that such endogenizing enhanced the coordination of subjects through monetary exchange. The subjects endogenously reduced the trade friction of monetary exchanges and chose relatively efficient money holdings distributions and transaction prices. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.014

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  • Does cheap talk promote coordination under asymmetric information? An experimental study on global games

    Jieyi Duan, Hajime Kobayashi, Tatsuhiro Shichijo

    JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS   86   2020.6

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC  

    This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, we also consider endogenous investment timing. In the experiment, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making any decision, a subject sends the other player a free message that takes the form of continuous numerical value. The results show that both the cheap talk and the endogenous investment timing improve the efficiency of investments significantly, but the effect of the former is weaker than that of the latter. Moreover, data shows that when subjects' decision timing is endogenous, additional information from the cheap talk cannot further improve investment efficiency. Finally, the data report a high proportion of subjects sending truth-telling messages, which is close to the value of the private signal. However, some subjects send exaggerated messages that are higher than their private signals, and the proportion of these subjects increases with time.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101519

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  • Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships

    Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta, Tadashi Sekiguchi

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY   166   311 - 323   2016.11

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    This paper extends a model of repeated partnerships by Radner et al. (1986) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose their sharing rule. A sharing rule is optimal if the repeated game under the sharing rule has a public strategy equilibrium whose payoff sum is not improved by any public strategy equilibrium under any sharing rule. Two key factors for the analysis are the efficiency loss from allowing only the more productive partner to work and the efficiency loss in any cooperative equilibrium from imperfect observability. If the latter loss is smaller than the former, a threshold discount factor exists below which an asymmetric sharing rule inducing only one partner to work every period is optimal. At the threshold, an optimal sharing rule uniquely exists that is also optimal for any greater discount factor. The latter sharing rule reduces to the equal sharing rule for identical partners. The optimal equilibrium payoff sum as a function of the discount factor is a step function whose jump occurs at the threshold discount factor. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004

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  • Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

    Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta

    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR   76 ( 2 )   636 - 647   2012.11

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    We investigate optimal collusion in repeated multimarket contact under imperfect public monitoring, where two firms operate in m markets and in each market, each firm's decision and public signals are binary. We show that in an optimal pure strategy strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium, the size of efficiency loss is equal to that in the market with the most tempting deviation under single-market contact. Furthermore, we show a sufficient condition under which the symmetric equilibrium is optimal for joint payoff maximization among any perfect public equilibrium. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003

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  • Multimarket contact in continuous-time games

    Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta

    ECONOMICS LETTERS   101 ( 1 )   4 - 5   2008.10

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

    This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.031

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  • Intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations

    Munetomo Ando, Hajime Kobayashi

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION   65 ( 3-4 )   757 - 767   2008.3

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

    This paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization. The organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short-lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period. This results in intergenerational conflicts of interest. The old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit, while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits. We use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.01.005

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  • Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games played by organizations with short-lived members

    Hajime Kobayashi

    INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW   48 ( 2 )   517 - 549   2007.5

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC  

    We consider infinitely repeated games played by organizations with short-lived members. Each member enters the organization with no prior memory. He plays the role of taking actions for stage games in the first half of his lifetime. In the beginning of the second half, when a new member enters the organization, the existing member privately sends a message to the new member. He remains in the organization for the second half, and then retires from the game. We prove that folk theorems hold in this environment; that is, organizations essentially implement Fudenberg and Maskin strategies.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00436.x

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  • EMERGENCE OF LEADERSHIP IN TEAMS*

    HAJIME KOBAYASHI, HIDEO SUEHIRO

    The Japanese Economic Review   56 ( 3 )   295 - 316   2005.9

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    Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLC  

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00328.x

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Books

  • Organizational Economics

    Hideshi Itoh, Hajime Kobayashi, Yasuyuki Miyahara( Role: Joint author)

    Yuhikaku  2019.12 

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MISC

Research Projects

  • 貨幣モデルにおける財政・金融政策:実験によるアプローチ

    Grant number:21H00697  2021.4 - 2026.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 基盤研究(B)  基盤研究(B)

    神谷 和也, 小林 創, 七條 達弘, 清水 崇

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    Grant amount:\15990000 ( Direct Cost: \12300000 、 Indirect Cost:\3690000 )

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  • 情報選択とリーダーシップの実験研究

    Grant number:19K01544  2019.4 - 2022.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 基盤研究(C)  基盤研究(C)

    末廣 英生, 小林 創, 安部 浩次

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    Grant amount:\1950000 ( Direct Cost: \1500000 、 Indirect Cost:\450000 )

    本研究では、チーム生産において被験者がチーム生産性の不完備情報の状況におかれざるを得ない場合で、チーム生産性に関して各メンバーが受け取る部分情報の在り方を被験者が選ぶことができる場合、被験者はどのような在り方を選ぶか、その選択がチーム生産におけるリーダーシップの出現をどのように左右するかを、ゲーム実験で明らかにすることを目指している。特に、メンバーが受け取る部分情報の在り方として、(A)メンバー間の情報が独立、(B)メンバー間の情報が相関、の2通りを考える。2019年度は、その実験設計の理論的研究を行った。
    過去の研究成果によれば、(A)(B)のいずれの情報の在り方の下でも、リーダーシップが部分的に出現することが分かっている。しかし、(A)の状況でリーダーシップが起こるメカニズムと(B)の状況でリーダーシップが起こるメカニズムは異なると推測される。我々は、(A)の独立情報の場合にはメンバー間で分散する情報のシグナリングのメカニズムがリーダーシップを生起させ、(B)の相関情報の場合にはreciprocityを引き出すためのメカニズムとしてリーダーシップが生起するという仮説を立てた。本研究では、そのメカニズムの相違に関わる被験者の属性を測っておくwithin測定の実験設計をしなければならない。さらに、チーム生産のための情報選択行為自体が、その選択機会がない場合に比べてチーム生産におけるリーダーシップの出現に与える影響を識別する設計も求められる。2019年度の理論研究では、これらの実験設計の検討項目を研究したが、最終的な解決策を見出すに至らなかった。

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  • Reputation formation and umbrella branding in multi-product firms: Theory and Experiment

    Grant number:18K01526  2018.4 - 2022.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

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    Grant amount:\4160000 ( Direct Cost: \3200000 、 Indirect Cost:\960000 )

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  • Determinants of prices in search models of money: theory and experiment

    Grant number:16H03596  2016.4 - 2021.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Kamiya Kazuya

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    Grant amount:\16120000 ( Direct Cost: \12400000 、 Indirect Cost:\3720000 )

    In this study, we clarified what equilibria and prices subjects would choose by conducting economic experiments using random matching models with divisible money, where there is a continuum of stationary equilibria. More specifically, the experiment was conducted under the following different conditions and we analyzed the results: 1. changes in the basic setup (amounts of money and distributions of money holdings in the beginning), 2. changes in monetary policy (various patterns of money injection), and 3. various economic environments (other than random matching). We obtain several results. Among them, the important one is that the efficiency of monetary transactions is higher in the case of divisible money than in the case of indivisible money. Asymmetric properties are also obtained when the amount of money is increased or decreased.

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  • On economics of effective leadership

    Grant number:16K21038  2016.4 - 2019.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    Abe Koji, KOBAYASHI Hajime, SHICHIJO Tatsuhiro, SUEHIRO Hideo, TOKU Hisashi

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    Grant amount:\3380000 ( Direct Cost: \2600000 、 Indirect Cost:\780000 )

    I study how leadership works in an organization. First, using a game theoretical model with a traditional payoff environment, I show that leadership by example works if the organization faces uncertainty of payoff environment and if there are two uncertain payoff environments as describe below. In one environment, all members should make their effort for the organization. In the other environment, all members should not make their effort for the organization. Second, using a game experiment, I confirm that leadership by example works in an appropriate environment. Third, using a behavioral game theoretical model, I consider an organization in a social dilemma situation and show that leadership by example can resolve the social dilemma. I relate this resolution of social dilemma to how members in the organization dislike inequality outcomes.

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  • Game Theoretic and Experimental Study on Information Sharing and Leadership

    Grant number:15K03354  2015.4 - 2019.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    Suehiro Hideo, ABE Koji, KOBAYASHI Hajime, TOKU Hisashi

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    Grant amount:\4420000 ( Direct Cost: \3400000 、 Indirect Cost:\1020000 )

    This research aims at identifying a mechanism of leadership in teams. Specifically, we consider such a possibility that leadership is voluntarily taken by a team member who personally believes that effort is worth taking in his team. First, we formulated a game model of team production in which each member spends effort for his team given a judgment he personally holds about team productivity. We proved that leadership is realized in equilibrium if these judgments are independent across members, whereas it is not if they are correlated. Then, we tested this theory by conducting laboratory experiments. The result is that we observed emergence of leadership in teams in which subjects’ judgments about team productivity were stochastically independent, which coincides with the theoretical prediction. However, we also observed emergence of leadership in teams in which subjects’ judgments about team productivity were correlated, which contradicts with the theory.

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  • Experimental analysis of the effect of joint target on team production

    Grant number:26380242  2014.4 - 2017.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    Shichijo Tatsuhiro, DUAN Jieyi, TOKU Hisashi

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    Grant amount:\4160000 ( Direct Cost: \3200000 、 Indirect Cost:\960000 )

    We conducted analysis by experiment, in an environment where self-signaling is not satisfied and it is difficult for cheep talk to work, (i) whether target setting by cheap talk has a positive influence on team production, (ii) whether signal with certain cost has a positive influence on team production.
    As a result of the analysis, although the influence of simple cheap talk on team production is limited, the target setting by cheap talk has a positive influence on team production, and furthermore, certain costly signaling is also positive effect for team production.

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  • Repeated game analysis on long-term partnerships

    Grant number:26780122  2014.4 - 2017.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    OHTA KATSUNORI, KOBAYASHI Hajime, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi

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    Grant amount:\1950000 ( Direct Cost: \1500000 、 Indirect Cost:\450000 )

    We investigate cooperation in teams by theoretical analysis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In particular, we extend the model of repeated partnerships by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986, Review of economic Studies) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose and commit their sharing rule to achieve the most efficient equilibrium in the sense of maximizing the partners' total payoffs. We characterize the optimal sharing rule which supports the most efficient equilibrium payoff vector. We also consider the situation where it is not efficient for all members to work, and obtain the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve exact efficiency. Even when the condition fails, we obtain the approximate efficiency result.

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  • Game Theoretic Studies of Endogenous Leadership in Prisoner's Dilemma with Inequity-Averse Preferences

    Grant number:24530198  2012.4 - 2015.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    SUEHIRO Hideo, KOBAYASHI Hajime, ABE Koji

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    Grant amount:\2210000 ( Direct Cost: \1700000 、 Indirect Cost:\510000 )

    When a group of individuals work in a team, there often arises a prisoner's dilemma, in which it is desirable for all the members of the team to make effort for the team while each member dose not find an interest to make the effort alone. It is widely experienced that such a dilemma is resolved occasionally by leadership in which a member of the team voluntarily make the effort in ahead of others. This fact is also verified in the research of experimental economics. However, it remains unexplored why such a limited leadership is observed.
    We took into account the reported human nature that an individual tends to avoid his receiving less benefit than others in the team and to avoid also his receiving more benefit than others in the team. We showed by the method of game theory that an individual with a particular parameters of those aversion takes the leadership.

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  • Accumulating Information in Repeated Financial Transactions: Theory and Experiment

    Grant number:24530207  2012.4 - 2015.3

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    KOBAYASHI Hajime, OHTA Katsunori, SAITO Tetsuya, SHICHIJO Tatsuhiro

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    Grant amount:\4550000 ( Direct Cost: \3500000 、 Indirect Cost:\1050000 )

    We investigated a moral hazard problem in financial transactions. Specifically, we consider a repeated prisoner's dilemma between two players in which players can not observe the opponent's action but imperfectly observe signals depending on their actions. We compare efficiency losses in the different timings of releasing information combining with the different levels of noise of signals.
    We found that the level of cooperation decreases as the timing of releasing signal becomes late. This experimental result implies that timely disclosure policy enhances efficiency in financial markets.

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  • Game Theoretic Study on Information and Leadership

    Grant number:21530168  2009 - 2011

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    SUEHIRO Hideo, KOBAYASHI Hajime

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    Grant amount:\2080000 ( Direct Cost: \1600000 、 Indirect Cost:\480000 )

    With a game theoretic model, we studied how a probability with which a member of a team takes a leadership behavior in team production differs depending on his informational ability with which he forms his assessment of team productivity. We studied the sequential equilibrium in a team with symmetric informational abilities and in a team with asymmetric informational abilities. We found that(1) there exists a sequential equilibrium both in a symmetric ability team and in an asymmetric ability team,(2) there may exist multiple sequential equilibria both in a symmetric ability team and in an asymmetric ability team, and(3) it is not necessarily the case that a probability of taking a leadership behavior is increased when his/her informational ability is improved.

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  • Institutional Design using virtual society and laboratory experiments

    Grant number:20200042  2008 - 2011

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Innovative Areas (Research a proposed research project)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Innovative Areas (Research a proposed research project)

    SHICHIJO Tatsuhiro, FUJIYAMA Hideki, TOMOCHI Masaki, KUSAKAWA Takao, AKIYOSHI Mito, TANAKA Atsushi, KANAI Masayuki, KAGOYA Kazuhiro, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi, MATSUBARA Shigeo, KOBAYASHI Jun, TAKEDA Toshihiro, TORIUMI Fujio, FUKUDA Emiko, OGAWA Kazuhito, MUTOU Masayoshi, KOBAYASHI Hazime

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    Grant amount:\36790000 ( Direct Cost: \28300000 、 Indirect Cost:\8490000 )

    As a platform of a virtual society experiment, we built a system of social networking, and added the functions of wiki, online questionnaire, vitalization experiments and matching experiments. We obtained some theoretical results, such as, the condition under which vitalization of the SNS occurs. On the other hand, from our experimental results, we confirmed that the specific point system which we constructed is effective for vitalization of SNS, and that long-term relationship can induce cooperative action between people with short-term relationship. Moreover, by survey we investigated the connection between activity in SNS and ordinal human relationship.

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  • Formation of collaboration network in long-term relationships

    Grant number:19730145  2007 - 2008

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    KOBAYASHI Hazime, OHTA Katsunori, SUEHIRO Hideo, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi

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    Grant amount:\1810000 ( Direct Cost: \1600000 、 Indirect Cost:\210000 )

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  • Repeated games and collusive behavior

    Grant number:19730174  2007 - 2008

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    OHTA Katsunori, KOBAYASHI Hajime, SEKIGUCHI Tadashi

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    Grant amount:\690000 ( Direct Cost: \600000 、 Indirect Cost:\90000 )

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  • Experiments on Emergence of Leadership

    Grant number:18530138  2006 - 2008

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    SUEHIRO Hideo, KOBYASHI Hajime

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    Grant amount:\1800000 ( Direct Cost: \1500000 、 Indirect Cost:\300000 )

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Devising educational methods

  • 分析の枠組みとしての理論の解説と、事例を通じてどのように理論を運用するかについて解説した。これによって理論と実践のバランスのとれた見方を受講者は得られた。このスタンスについて、受講した学生からの反応も良好で、興味を持って取り組んでいたようである。 理論を学習するにあたっては、教官オリジナルの演習問題を解くことで理論の理解を深めた。これらは教官のHPから常時ダウンロードできるように整備した。実証的な分析をするにあたり、具体的なデータ分析手続きをPCを活用して解説した。近年のデータ分析はPC上で処理するので、それに慣れるためにも有効であったと考えられる。  最後に、学習上生じた疑問等の解決を図るため、オフィスアワーを設けて対応するとともに、オフィスアワーに来られない受講生には、予約制で対応した。

Teaching materials

  • 理論編の解説、演習問題、およびその解答を作成した。これらはすべて教官のオリジナルなものである。 また、事例分析に当たってはハーバード・ビジネススクールのケースを用いて、米国企業における成果報酬制度の功罪や企業文化の生成と衰退について学習した。

Teaching method presentations

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Special notes on other educational activities

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