Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

In this paper we compare the performance of emission taxes and tradable permits under free market entry when firms face idiosyncratic ex ante cost uncertainty. We show that under auctioned permits insufficient entry occurs, while under a linear emission tax scheme, depending on parameters, market entry can be either excessive or insufficient. Our long-run analysis thus contrasts with Spulber's (1985) equivalence result and also modifies Weitzman's result in favor of an ETS in that the superiority of a tax over an ETS is not guaranteed, even when the Weitzman condition favors a tax. We also show that an ETS is superior to a tax scheme when the entry cost is low and the magnitude of uncertainty/asymmetric information and the size of the output market are large. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jeem.2015.09.002

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

This paper estimates the average social cost of municipal waste management as a function of the recycling rate. Social costs include all municipal costs and revenues, costs to recycling households to prepare materials estimated with an original method, external disposal costs, and external recycling benefits. Results suggest average social costs are minimized with recycling rates well below observed and mandated levels in Japan. Cost-minimizing municipalities are estimated to recycle less than the optimal rate. These results are robust to changes in the components of social costs, indicating that Japan and perhaps other developed countries may be setting inefficiently high recycling goals. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jeem.2014.01.004

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Part of collection (book)   Publisher：Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.  

DOI： 10.4337/9780857936868.00021

Scopus

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

We investigate the price premium on certified wood from sustainable forests, using data from more than 38,000 log transactions in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan. We found a positive and statistically significant effect of certification. The premium added by certification was 1.4% more than the price of conventional logs. This was well in the lower range of additional willingness to pay found in previous studies that used stated preference techniques. The effect of certification varies by wood species. The premium for cedar is 4.0%, while that for cypress is statistically insignificant. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.forpol.2013.07.002

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

We examine the substitutability of waste and scrap exported from different countries by estimating the export demand functions of China. In particular, we focus on the export of other ferrous waste and scrap (HS code 720449) and other waste, parings and scrap of plastics (HS code 391590). It is shown that the substitutability of these wastes and scraps is weak among the exporting countries. Our empirical results imply that a uniform ban on trading hazardous waste, represented by the Basel Ban, could be an inefficient environmental policy. © 2013 Cambridge University Press.

DOI： 10.1017/S1355770X13000302

Scopus

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

This paper examines environmental effects of trade in recycled materials in a two-country model of international trade with a vertical structure. Downstream duopoly firms located in different countries can use recycled materials as an input to produce a recyclable final good. With heterogeneous recovery rates, the final good is recycled by upstream recycling duopoly firms located in each country. We first explore the conditions for the emergence of bilateral trade in the recycled materials and then examine the effects of liberalizing trade in the upstream as well as the downstream market on environmental damage. We show that, depending on the heterogeneity in the recovery rates between the two countries, trade liberalization in each vertically related market can be detrimental or beneficial to the environment. © 2012 Springer.

DOI： 10.1007/s10018-012-0036-4

Scopus

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Our objective is to analyze the effectiveness, against the illegal disposal of waste, of a licensing system that has been introduced in a waste management policy. We theoretically find enforcement leverage in the licensing system, and then examine the theoretical result empirically. The results suggest that extending liability to disposers, which forms the basis of the enforcement leverage, deters illegal disposal more effectively than increasing penalties for illegal disposal. We also obtain evidence of transboundary movement of illegal disposal, and find how the court determines penalties for illegal disposal. © 2011 Springer.

DOI： 10.1007/s10018-011-0024-0

Scopus

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：SPRINGER  

A system requiring a waste management license from an enforcement agency has been introduced in many countries. A license system is usually coupled with fines, a manifest, and a disposal tax. However, these policy devices have not been integrated into an optimal policy. In this paper we derive an optimal waste management policy by using those policy devices. Waste management policies are met with three difficult problems: asymmetric information, the heterogeneity of waste management firms, and non-compliance by waste management firms and waste disposers. The optimal policy in this paper overcomes all three problems.

DOI： 10.1007/s11149-010-9136-x

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC  

It is well known that China and India have been recycling centers of WEEE, especially printed circuit boards, and that serious environmental pollution in these countries has been generated by improper recycling methods. After the governments of China and India banned improper recycling by the informal sector, improper recycling activities spread to other places. Then, these governments changed their policies to one of promoting proper recycling by introducing a scheme, under which E-waste recycling requires a license issued by the government. In this paper, the effectiveness of that license scheme is examined by means of an economic model. It can be shown that the license scheme can work effectively only if disposers of E-waste have a responsibility to sell E-waste to license holders. Our results run counter to the idea that international E-waste trade should be banned and provide an alternative solution to the problem. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.eiar.2009.09.002

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC  

End-of-life home appliances discarded in Japan are reused in Southeast Asia; end-of-life computers are reused in China. E-waste scrap generated in Asia is recycled in China, especially in Guangdong Province. The informal sector in that province has been recycling E-waste scrap and its improper recycling methods have caused serious pollution. In response to this problem, there is wide support for a total ban on E-waste trade, including secondhand items and E-waste scrap. Alternatively. we recommend the establishment of an alternative proper recycling system in Asia that needs cooperation among all Asian countries. First, China is urged to promote proper domestic recycling activities by providing a subsidy for proper recycling. Second, Japan, as a main exporter of E-waste, should establish a traceability system that ensures E-waste scrap exported from Japan will be recycled at proper recycling facilities in China. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.eiar.2008.04.004

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

This paper analyzes the optimal waste disposal policy for durable goods. The existing literature does not differentiate between durable and non-durable goods and concludes that the social optimum can be attained by either a disposal fee (DF) policy or an advance disposal fee (ADF) policy in an economy without transaction costs. This study shows, however, that in such an economy the first-best policy is not an ADF policy but a DF policy. Adoption of an ADF policy results in excessive consumption and disposal compared to the social optimum. In addition, under an ADF policy the lifetime of durable goods is shorter than the social optimum. If we take transaction costs into account, we must consider the second-best policy. An ADF policy can be considered as second-best in some situations, since it has some transaction cost advantages over other policies. An ADF policy can be second-best either if net disposal cost is relatively low or if repair cost is relatively high. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.07.003

Web of Science

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCI LTD  

In simple models, the cutoff grade has been shown to depend on the rate of growth of price net of the interest rate. But there is disagreement in the literature about whether the cutoff grade is positively or negatively related to this variable. In a model which involves two stages of production and a general grade distribution, we find that the rate of growth of price net of the interest rate has an influence, but that the sign of the effect is ambiguous because it depends on a complicated factor involving technical, mine-specific elasticities. This mine-specificity is consistent with the fact that engineering textbooks present the problem of optimal exploitation very simply, using a constant grade, and the fact that engineers use simulation in decision making. It also points to the possibility of moral hazard in exploitation, a possibility of potential concern to managers, shareholders and policy makers. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.resourpol.2004.06.002

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL  

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.
In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.
Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

There exists a rule of thumb of mines, which decides how the cut-off grade (the lowest grade of extracted ore) should change in response to a change in the price of the metal. It requires that the cut-off grade should decrease (increase) when the present value price of metal increases (decreases). In this paper, the optimality of the rule will be examined by generalizing the Cairns-Krautkraemer model under the perfect foresight assumption. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: Q32.

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCI LTD  

There exists a rule of thumb of mines, which requires that the cut-off grade, that is the lowest grade of extracted ore, should decrease (increase) when the present value price of metal increases (decreases). Theoretically, it was shown that the mining rule is optimal, if the deposit has a disorderly ore quality distribution. Conversely, if the deposit has an orderly ore quality distribution, the reverse rule is optimal, where the reverse rule requires that the cut-off grade should increase (decrease) when the present value price of metal increases (decreases). In this paper, the theoretical results are tested empirically from the data of 51 copper mines during 1970-1992. It is found that they are supported by the data. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Web of Science

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

There exists a rule of thumb of mines, which requires that the cut-off grade should decrease (increase) when the price of metal increases (decreases). The mining rule, however, has been considered as irrational by both resource economists and mining engineers. This work derives the conditions under which this rule has economic rationality. The mining process of development has an important role in resolving the contradiction between practice and theory. If the marginal development cost is sufficiently large, the rule has economic rationality. © 1998, JAPAN SECTION OF THE REGIONAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.2457/srs.28.2_55

Scopus

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Public lecture, seminar, tutorial, course, or other speech  

researchmap

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

researchmap

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

researchmap