researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

Rationality and Society より再録

researchmap

『理論と方法』より再録

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

重点領域研究助成

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：JAPANESE ASSOC MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY  

In this paper, we discuss one of the major factors in social capital, the issue of trust, in terms of detection of trustworthiness of others. Yamagishi's Emancipation Theory of Trust concluded that high trusters, or people who have a high level of general trustfulness toward others, have social intelligence to accurately detect the general character of others. Kikuchi, Watanabe, and Yamagishi's Detection Experiment provided the empirical basis of such a conclusion. However, the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) Game adopted in the Detection Experiment did not necessarily use appropriate alternatives of behaviors for participants as indicators of the general characters of people. Consequently, the results from the experiment are not appropriate for reviewing the ability to "detect a particular person's general character." In order to overcome such problems and to measure the ability to detect a person's trustworthiness more appropriately, we conducted a laboratory experiment by adopting the game of enthronement. After a series of analyses, we could not confirm such a relationship between trustfulness and the ability to detect trustworthiness as discussed in a series of studies by Yamagishi. On the other hand, after reviewing the relationship between breadth of beliefs about others and the ability to detect trustworthiness of others based on Kelley and Stahelski's Triangle Hypothesis in a traditional PD game study, we could confirm that it is a person's assumptions or beliefs about internalization of social norms by others that determine the accuracy of his/her ability to detect trustworthiness of others.

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：JAPANESE ASSOC MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY  

In this paper, we focused on trust as one of the factors of social capital, and examined its generating processes by comparing two main theoretical approaches of trust - the Emancipation Theory of Trust and the Reduction Approach. The former theory states that creation of general trust will be undermined when commitment relations with specific others are strong, whereas the latter approach states that strength of commitment relations with specific others provides the basis for nurturing general trust. First we examined the relationship between city size (supposedly an indicator of the strength of committed relations) and the level of general trust using data from two social surveys conducted in Japan. The result of the analysis showed no correlation between city size and the level of general trust. Then we performed structural equation modeling to explore the relationships between a wider variety of capitals, social resources and general trust. The results of the analyses show that general trust is nurtured when it is based on relations of trust with specific people. In other words, the result is diametrically opposed to the Emancipation Theory of Trust in that it implies that placing a high priority on existing relationships with people fosters accumulation of general trust and therefore of social capital.

Web of Science

researchmap

researchmap

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Group Dynamics Association  

Four studies examined findings by Kosugi & Yamagishi (1998) that high-trusters presented with negative information about others exhibit a more pronounced response than do low-trusters presented with the same information. Survey 1 showed that the general trust scale used by Kosugi & Yamagishi (1998) did not provide an appropriate index for the investigation of the relationship between people's general trust level and the patterns of their responses to information about others' trustworthiness. Given the results of survey 1, two experiments and a mail survey were conducted using a different measure of general trust. The results demonstrated that low-trusters were strongly affected by positive information about others and quickly express an inclination to trust the target individuals. The findings of the three studies illustrate that the responses of high-trusters and low-trusters form a symmetric pattern, and each group's strategy can be interpreted as an adaptation that helps to increase actors' opportunities to interact with others.<br>

DOI： 10.2130/jjesp.44.27

CiNii Books

researchmap

Other Link： https://jlc.jst.go.jp/DN/JALC/00251737991?from=CiNii

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and unanimity decision rules on group decisions involving continuous alternatives. Each experiment used mock civil juries to test three hypotheses related to the claim that when the distribution of group members' initial preferences is skewed, the group's decision will be influenced more by the presence of outlier members under unanimity rule than under majority rule. Experiment 1 tested the hypotheses using a punitive damages case and positively skewed preference distributions. Experiment 2 tested the hypotheses using a compensatory damages case and manipulating the skewness of preference distributions in a 2 (group decision rule) x 2 (valence of skewness) factorial design. In both experiments, the extreme (outlier) member's individual preference was significantly correlated with the group decision only under unanimity rule. A simple thought experiment based on the experimental results is suggested regarding the implications of using unanimity or majority rule for making decisions in civil juries. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.jesp.2003.07.005

Web of Science

researchmap

重点領域研究助成

researchmap

林英夫、土田昭司、林直保子、松本敦、箱井英寿、矢島誠人、池上和之、柏尾眞津子、小城英子、吉川聡一

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD  

Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their partner. We examine two bases for the expectation of a partner's cooperation in one-shot games: 'general trust' and a 'sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a sense of control to play different roles in societies, particularly in Japanese society and American society. Specifically, we test a general hypothesis that a sense of control plays a relatively more important role as a foundation for expectations in Japanese society and general trust plays the more important role in American society.

Web of Science

researchmap

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：SAGE Publications Inc.  

The theoretical implications of introducing the "selective play" paradigm to experimental gaming research are discussed. In the traditional "forced play" environment, players are locked in a particular relationship and do not have options of leaving the current relationship and joining another. In the selective play environment players are given the options of leaving the current relationship and forming a new relationship. A previous computer tournament of prisoner's dilemma network (Hayashi, 1993) showed that out-for-tat (OFT) strategy performed very well in the selective play environment. OFT keeps cooperating with a partner until the partner defects
it deserts the partner and turns to someone else as soon as the partner defects. Results of a new computer tournament that introduced opportunity costs, however, point to the limits of the OFT's strength. OFT prematurely forms a commitment relationship with a cooperative partner and fails to utilize better opportunities. The best performer in the second tournament was the only one who was "trustful" and had a positive bias in calculating the expected payoff of interactions with a "stranger." Copyright © 1998 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

DOI： 10.1207/s15327957pspr0204_4

Scopus

researchmap

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：JAPAN PSYCHOL ASSOC  

Experimental gaming researchers have recently realized that a larger context is important in which dyadic prisoner's dilemma (PD) relations are embedded. The main purpose of this study was to examine whether people facing a ''selective-play'' situation spontaneously adopt the out-for-tar strategy (OFT), which previous studies found the most effective in such a situation. OFT proscribes to (1) always cooperate, (2) keep playing with the current player as long as he/she cooperates, and (3) desert the partner as soon as he/she slops cooperating. Results of an experiment with 90 students, of groups of six or eight, showed that subjects who faced a high level of social uncertainty in fact spontaneously adopted the strategy, interacting with the same partner as long as he/she uncertainty kept only the third part of the strategy, leaving the relation with a defector, but not necessarily keeping interaction with a cooperative partner.

Web of Science

researchmap

Publisher：The Japanese Group Dynamics Association  

By applying the"illusion of control"hypothesis (Karp et al., 1993), originally developed to explain ingroup favoritism in the minimal group experiments, to a prisoner's dilemma (PD) situation, we predicted that the cooperation rate of players would be affected by their illusion of control. We used a sequential PD in which one player decides before the other does to maximize and minimize feasibility of illusion of control. Specifically, the following three hypotheses were successfully tested. Hypothesis 1: The decision of the second player in a sequential PD would be affected by the choice of the first player, cooperating with the cooperative first player and defecting with the defective first player. Hypothesis 2: Compared to the players of ordinary simultaneous one-shot PD (simultaneous condition), the player who decides first and whose decision is informed to the second player before the latter makes his/her decision would feel controllability over the second player and thus would cooperate more. Hypothesis 3: Compared to the simltaneous condition, players uwould cooperate less when they know (without being informed of the first player's choice) that the first player has already made his/her decision. The second experiment was conducted to replicate Hypothesis 3, the most important hypothesis of the three. The hypothesis was also supported in the second experiment.

DOI： 10.2130/jjesp.36.183

CiNii Books

researchmap

Other Link： https://jlc.jst.go.jp/DN/JALC/00356026754?from=CiNii

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society of Social Psychology  

An experiment was conducted to test three hypotheses concerning effects of social uncertainty and general trust on commitment formation, hypotheses derived from Yamagishi & Yamagishi's (1994) theory of trust. First two hypotheses were supported, while the last one was not. First, increasing social uncertainty facilitated commitment formation. Second, low general trusters formed mutually committed relations more often than did high trusters. Finally, the prediction that the effect of general trust on commitment formation would be stronger in the high uncertainty condition than in the low uncertainty condition was not supported. Theoretical implications of these findings for the theory of trust advanced by Yamagishi and his associates are discussed.

DOI： 10.14966/jssp.KJ00003724698

CiNii Books

researchmap

Publisher：The Japanese Group Dynamics Association  

Two kinds of trust-general truat and particularistic trust-are theoretically distinguished. An experiment simulating buyer-seller relations successfully tested the following hypotheses concerning the effects of social uncertainty and subjects'general trust upon (a) commitment formation between a particular buyer and a seller and (b) the buyer's particularitsic trust in the seller. First, social uncertainty promoted commitment formation. Second, commitment formation promoted one partner's trust n the other (which we called particularistic trust). Third, as a result of the above two effects, social uncertainty promoted the general level of particularistic trust in a group. Fourth, general trust, which was defined as a general belief in human benevolence, suppressed commitment formation. However, the fifth hypothesis based on the second and the fourth hypotheses was not supported. That is, general trust did not suppress particularistic trust.

DOI： 10.2130/jjesp.35.23

CiNii Books

researchmap

Other Link： https://jlc.jst.go.jp/DN/JALC/00321411448?from=CiNii

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：JAPAN PSYCHOL ASSOC  

The main purpose of this study is to apply the ''selective pray paradigm'' to explain how cooperation emerges in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas. A unique Feature of the selective pray paradigm is the option for not playing a PD game. For this purpose, a computer simulation of 100-actor groups was conducted. At the beginning of each replication, each simulated actor was randomly assigned to one of eleven levels of trust, which indicates the actor's estimate of the overall cooperation rate in the group. Each simulated actor, then, decided whether or not to interact with the previous partner based on the calculated expected gains from interacting with one of the other partners. Results of the simulation show that: (1) when substantial opportunity costs exist, having a high lever of trust benefits the actor; (2) the above effect of trust depends on the actor's cooperativeness in PD games; (3) but does not depend on the overall cooperation rate in the group.

Web of Science

researchmap

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Prisoners dilemaa is often considered a model of social phenomena. However most PD studies are limited to isolated dyadic relations, which is not considered to be embedded in a large network structure. To generalize the findingsof PD studies, we need to overcome this limitation. The purpose of this paper is to extend PD studies to multiple PD relations among group members. This new paradigm is called the ‘prisoners dilemma network.’ What makes the PD network distinct from the 2-person PD is the option for choosing partners. In the PD network situation, ‘PD pairs’ come into existence only by mutual selection, such that a relationship between specific two persons may be short-lived. In such a situation, tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, that has been proven to be effective in isolated PD relations in promoting mutual cooperation, may not be effective. To find out what strategies are effective in PD network situation, a contest of computer programs was held, In the results of this contest, out-for-tat (OFT) strategy showed its effectiveness. OFT is the strategy that assigns the first priority to the partner of the last trial unless the partner defected there. Because OFT has four features of TFT: niceness, simpleness, responsiveness, and forgivingness, it may be said that the OFT strategy is the TFT on partner selection. © 1993, Japanese Association For Mathematical Sociology. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.11218/ojjams.8.19

Scopus

researchmap

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society of Social Psychology  

The main purpose of this study was to examine how the existence of multiple Prisoner's Dilemma relations among group members affects their choices in each PD relation. Twenty-eight computer simulated actors were used to simulate group members. Each simulated-actor had two kinds of strategies: (1) designation strategy (i.e., strategy to determine whom to choose as a game partner), and (2) behavior strategy (i.e., strategy to determine when to cooperate and when to defect). The simulation involved four designation strategies, and seven behavior strategies. Five of behavior strategies were variants of the tit-for tat strategy, said to be most effective in iterated 2-person PD games. Results of the simulation indicate that: (1) the designation strategy has a greater influence on the simulated-actor' total score than the behavior strategy; (2) effectiveness of the behavior strategy changes depending on the designation strategy adopted; (3) the relationship between disignation and behavior strategies mentioned above depends on the nature of the pay-off matrix used in each game played along the PD network.

DOI： 10.14966/jssp.KJ00003725204

CiNii Books

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

researchmap

Country：Japan

researchmap