Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：Springer  

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Authorship：Lead author   Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：Wiley  

We reconsider the effects of a policy that sets an artificially low interest rate. Such a policy involves a combination of an interest rate ceiling and a rationing rule that assigns a priority-lending status to export sectors over domestic service sectors. We demonstrate that the policy works as an export-promotion policy, and improves national income. Furthermore, under some conditions, the policy expands the domestic service sector, despite the reduced amount of funds owing to the rationing rule. Finally, the artificially low interest rate improves national welfare.

DOI： 10.1111/jere.12056

Web of Science

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

We examine the human capital Kuznets curve in a simple model that does not assume increasing returns to scale in human capital formation. With a utility function that specifies a subsistence consumption level, consumption is a necessary good and education is a luxury good. As the children of poor households receive a low level of education, the gap in human capital endowments expands between poor and rich households. Eventually, economic development increases income and expenditure for education, and income inequality declines. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.012

Web of Science

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

Proposing a simple two sector model with occupational choice, this paper analyzes the relationship between optimal public education policy and industrial structure. Workers are employed based on their skills and education policy influences the distribution of human capital. Thus, the industrial structure determines whether an elite education policy or an egalitarian education policy is desirable. In particular, this paper indicates how the productivities of each sector and market sizes affect optimal public education policy. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.econmod.2010.05.001

Web of Science

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Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

CiNii Books

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

This paper studies the Friedman rule for the optimal quantity of money in money in the utility (MIU) and cash-credit models while considering two specifications for the endogenous discount factor. In the first specification, the discount factor depends directly on the utility level. In the second, the discount factor depends on every component of the utility function. We show that under the former specification the Friedman rule is the optimal policy. Under the latter, however, while the Friedman rule is optimal for the MIU model, it is not optimal for the cash-credit model. © 2009 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

DOI： 10.1016/j.qref.2009.04.003

Scopus

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Authorship：Corresponding author   Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

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Authorship：Lead author,　Corresponding author   Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

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Authorship：Lead author,　Corresponding author   Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

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Language：English   Publisher：Hokkaido University  

This paper analyzes the negotiation for ownership share of an international joint venture. We use Nash Bargaining to determine ownership and specify firms' behavior at the disagreement point: if the negotiation fails, the market becomes a Cournot duopoly. We show that all exogenous parameters have some effect on the equilibrium ownership share; even parameters that have no effect on the joint venture's production have an effect on the ownership share because they change the participating firms' bargaining positions. It is also shown that an increase in fixed cost may increase or decrease the ownership share depending on the initial bargaining positions. (JEL Classifi-cation: L24)

CiNii Books

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