Updated on 2025/01/14

写真a

 
FUJINAKA,Yuji
 
Organization
Faculty of Economics Associate Professor
Title
Associate Professor
Contact information
メールアドレス
External link

Degree

  • 博士 ( 2007.3 )

Research Interests

  • Mechanism design

Research Areas

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory

Education

  • Kobe University   Graduate School of Economics

    2004.4 - 2007.3

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  • Kobe University   Graduate School of Economics

    2001.4 - 2004.3

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  • Kobe University   Faculty of Economics

    1997.4 - 2001.3

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Research History

  • Kansai University   Faculty of Economics   Associate Professor

    2017.4

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  • Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics   Faculty of Economics

    2012.4 - 2017.3

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  • Assistant Professor, Graduate Schoolof Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology

    2010.9 - 2012.3

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  • Assistant Professor, Faculty of Urban Liberal Arts, Tokyo Metropolitan University   Faculty of Urban Liberal Arts

    2009.4 - 2010.8

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  • PD, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

    2007.4 - 2009.3

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Professional Memberships

Papers

  • Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values Reviewed

    FUJINAKA,Yuji, MIYAKAWA,Toshiji

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   Vol.91, pp.157-164   2020.12

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  • Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation Reviewed

    FUJINAKA,Yuji, WAKAYAMA,Takuma

    Games and Economic Behavior   Vol.111, pp.187-202   187 - 202   2018.9

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by swapping their endowments before the operation of the chosen rule. A rule is called endowments swapping-proof if it is immune to this kind of manipulation. Our main result is that the top trading cycles rule is the only rule that satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004

    Web of Science

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  • Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money Reviewed

    Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY   158   165 - 185   2015.7

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    We consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non-quasi-linear preferences. The purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that under a certain domain-richness condition, each individual obtains the welfare level of his "optimal" envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy-free solution: if an envy-free solution satisfies a mild condition, the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy-free allocations. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014

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  • Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets Reviewed

    Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama

    ECONOMIC THEORY   48 ( 1 )   147 - 169   2011.9

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER  

    This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23-37, 1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203-229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (2) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (3) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case: a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.

    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0538-x

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  • The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation Reviewed

    FUJINAKA,Yuji, SAKAI, Toyotaka

    International Journal of Game Theory   Vol 38-3, pp.325-348   2009

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  • Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money Reviewed

    Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama

    ECONOMICS LETTERS   100 ( 1 )   91 - 95   2008.7

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

    This paper studies secure implementation [Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Economics 2, 203-229] in economies with indivisible objects and money. We establish that on any minimally rich domain that is proposed in our paper, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable. (c) 2007 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.009

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  • The manipulability of fair solutions in assignment of an indivisible object with monetary transfers Reviewed

    Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY   9 ( 6 )   993 - 1011   2007.12

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:BLACKWELL PUBLISHING  

    Public decision making often involves the problem of fairly assigning one indivisible object to agents with monetary transfers. An example is the choice of the location of a garbage incineration facility where the accepting district should receive fair compensations from other districts. In this problem, we show that for broad classes of solutions satisfying a welfare lower bound and an efficiency- oriented condition, the set of equilibrium allocations in the manipulation game associated with a given solution coincides with the set of all envy- free allocations. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson'sequivalence result for a class of envy- free solutions. Our result covers the Shapley value, which is not covered by Tadenuma and Thomson's result.

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  • Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money Reviewed

    Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai

    ECONOMICS LETTERS   94 ( 2 )   253 - 258   2007.2

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

    We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We show that any Maskin monotonic allocation rule exhibits strong asymmetry in treating agents even on finitely restricted preference domains. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.038

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Books

  • メカニズムデザインー資源配分制度の設計とインセンティブー

    坂井 豊貴, 藤中 裕二, 若山 琢磨( Role: Joint author)

    ミネルヴァ書房  2008.8 

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