Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：Wiley  

Abstract

We construct a game‐theoretic model in which there are multiple countries with their own languages and each citizen can gain from additional communication in her secondarily acquired language. We demonstrate that in any equilibrium, a hegemonic language, which is a language that all citizens in other countries want to study, emerges. Such an equilibrium is more likely to exist if the size of the population of a country that is not the largest increases, or if the ratio of the gain from the additional communication in the second language to the cost of acquisition increases.

DOI： 10.1111/ijet.12332

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Other Link： https://www2.itc.kansai-u.ac.jp/~hatsumi/dp/hatsumi-ijet-lang.pdf

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：Elsevier BV  

DOI： 10.1016/j.japwor.2022.101134

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：SPRINGER  

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.

DOI： 10.1007/s00355-009-0370-z

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